Large shareholding and firm value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

Mona Mortazian; Seyedeh Asieh H. Tabaghdehi; Bryan Mase

doi:10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3

Large shareholding and firm value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

Mona Mortazian
, Seyedeh Asieh H. Tabaghdehi
, Bryan Mase

Regent's University London
Brunel University London

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32%. However, when their block sizes exceed 32%, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	229-252
Journal	Asia-Pacific Financial Markets
Volume	26
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3
Publication status	Published - 30 Nov 2018

Keywords

Investment

Access to Document

10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3

Handle.net

Persistent link

Cite this

@article{5b8326b790d74924a134253a987ec6f8,

title = "Large shareholding and firm value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)",

abstract = "This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32\%. However, when their block sizes exceed 32\%, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.",

keywords = "Investment",

author = "Mona Mortazian and Tabaghdehi, \{Seyedeh Asieh H.\} and Bryan Mase",

year = "2018",

month = nov,

day = "30",

doi = "10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3",

language = "English",

volume = "26",

pages = "229--252",

journal = "Asia-Pacific Financial Markets",

issn = "1387-2834",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Large shareholding and firm value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

AU - Mortazian, Mona

AU - Tabaghdehi, Seyedeh Asieh H.

AU - Mase, Bryan

PY - 2018/11/30

Y1 - 2018/11/30

N2 - This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32%. However, when their block sizes exceed 32%, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.

AB - This paper investigates the impact of non-managerial and managerial blockholders on the value of the firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This study mainly investigates whether the effect of blockholders on firm value is due to the AIM high ownership concentration and low investor protection. The primary empirical finding, using GMM, justifies that non-managerial and managerial blockholders in the AIM affect the firm value in different ways. Non-managerial blockholders in the AIM improve the firm value by monitoring managers when their block sizes are up to 32%. However, when their block sizes exceed 32%, the blockholders expropriate other shareholders.

KW - Investment

U2 - 10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3

DO - 10.1007/s10690-018-9256-3

M3 - Article

SN - 1387-2834

VL - 26

SP - 229

EP - 252

JO - Asia-Pacific Financial Markets

JF - Asia-Pacific Financial Markets

IS - 2

ER -

Large shareholding and firm value in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Handle.net

Fingerprint

Cite this